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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
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v. 
DAVID PETERSON, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 930132-CA 
Priority No. 2 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Appeal from a final order finding appellant in violation 
of probation. Original judgment and conviction was for theft, a 2nd 
degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-404, in the 
Third Judicial District Court in and for Salt Lake County, State of 
Utah, the Honorable Richard H. Moffat, Judge, presiding. 
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
DAVID PETERSON, 
Defendant/Appellant, 
Case No. 930132-CA 
Priority No. 2 
STATUTES, RULES, AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1 (9) (e) (Supp. 1988) provides:1 
(e) After hearing, the court shall make findings of 
fact. Upon a finding that the defendant violated the 
conditions of probation, the court may order the 
probation revoked, modified, continued, or that the 
entire probation term commence anew. If probation is 
revoked, the defendant shall be sentenced or the sentence 
previously imposed shall be executed. 
STATEMENT OF ADDITIONAL ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. Was the trial court's imposition of a one year term 
for a probation violation illegal? 
Standard of review — PLAIN ERROR. 
When objections are not made at trial and properly 
preserved, appellate review is under a "plain error" 
standard. Plain errors are those that "should have been 
obvious to the trial court and that affect the 
substantial rights of the accused." 
State v. Ellifritz, 835 P.2d 170, 174 (Utah App. 1992) (quoting 
State v. Morgan, 813 P.2d 1207, 1210-11 (Utah App. 1991). 
Amendments since 1988 have added "the" between "After" and 
"hearing" in the first phrase of this section. No substantive 
change has been made. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. MR. PETERSON MAINTAINED "VERIFIABLE. 
LAWFUL EMPLOYMENT AND/OR EDUCATION" AS 
REQUIRED. 
(Responding to State's Brief at 7, 10-12.) 
The State asserts that "Defendant does not dispute that 
he failed to maintain steady employment ..." State's Brief at 7. 
To the contrary, Mr. Peterson did maintain steady employment. Mr. 
Peterson's opening brief indicates only that "[t]he State put on no 
evidence whatsoever that indicated how Mr. Peterson could have 
obtained better, more steady employment." Id. at 10 (emphasis 
added). Mr. Peterson's employment was steady; the mere fact that 
he worked for a temporary agency does not mean he worked less than 
full-time, or that his work was not steady. Furthermore, 
"steadiness" is not a requirement of Mr. Peterson's probation 
agreement. See Probation agreement at KlO (R. at Exhibit 1). 
"Steadiness" is only required to the extent lack of a 
steady job indicates lack of a bona fide effort to comply with 
probation. As indicated in Mr. Peterson's opening brief, the State 
adduced no evidence that Mr. Peterson's efforts were other than 
bona _ de, or that better paying employment was available to him 
which would have allowed more payments towards his fine. 
The State has failed to prove a willful failure to meet 
the terms of the probation agreement. 
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POINT 11. THE EVIDENCE HAS BEEN PROPERLY 
MARSHALLED. 
(Responding to Appellee's Brief at 8-9.) 
The State improperly argues that Mr. Peterson has failed 
to marshal the evidence supporting the trial court's revocation 
order. To the contrary, Mr. Peterson's opening brief contains the 
following marshaling: 
Probation Officer Dale Hansen's Affidavit in 
Support of Order to Show Cause charges Mr. Peterson with 
violating the terms of his probation, as follows: 
1. By failing to maintain full-time 
employment and provide check stubs to 
verify employment, which is in violation 
of Condition Number 11 [sic - should be 
10] of the defendant's Probation 
Agreement. 
2. By failing to make regular payments 
toward his fine and surcharge of 
$1875.00, which is violation of Condition 
Number 11.A of the defendant's Probation 
Agreement. 
3. By failing to pay $5,300.00 in 
restitution and make regular payments, 
which is in violation of Condition Number 
11.A of the defendant's Probation 
Agreement. 
4. By failing to complete mental health 
treatment, which is in violation of 
Condition Number 11.B of the defendant's 
Probation Agreement. 
R. 135-6. 
At the hearing on the order to show cause, Mr. 
Peterson's probation officer, Mr. Dale Hansen, testified 
to the following: 
1. Mr. Peterson failed to provide proof of 
verifiable employment, and substantiate employment by 
providing copies of pay stubs. R. 174:6-7. 
2. Mr. Peterson had failed to make any 
payments towards his fine. However, Officer Hansen did 
admit that it is normal to pay restitution first, and 
then start making payments on the fine. R. 174:7. 
3. Mr. Peterson had made sporadic payments 
totalling $1,290 on his restitution obligation of $5,300. 
R. 174:7. On cross examination, Officer Hansen indicated 
that since August of 1992 he had received two payments 
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($10 and $150) on Mr. Peterson's restitution obligation. 
R. 174:9. 
4. Officer Hansen had nothing in his file 
indicating completion of a mental health evaluation, and 
any follow-up treatment indicated. R. 174:7-8. 
Opening Brief at 4-5. 
The transcript of the hearing in this case is quite brief 
(38 pages total) , and this Court is strongly encouraged to read it 
in its entirety. The evidence here is marshaled, and the issue 
presented must be addressed on the merits.2 
POINT III. ASSUMING THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY FOUND 
A PROBATION VIOLATION. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT 
ERR IN SENTENCING MR. PETERSON TO ONE YEAR 
INCARCERATION. 
(Responding to Point II, Appellee's Brief at 
14-15.) 
The State asserts that the trial court erred in 
sentencing Mr. Peterson to one year of incarceration in the Salt 
2It is difficult to oppose the State's unsupported claim of 
failure to marshal the evidence with anything short of a complete 
synopsis of the entire record in a case. The State rarely, if 
ever, supports its claim with any showing of precisely what 
evidence was not mentioned. In this situation, the appellate court 
is left in the uncomfortable position of deciding a credibility 
battle between the assistant attorney general and defense counsel. 
In properly analyzing a case to determine if there has 
been a failure to marshal the evidence, the assistant attorney 
general must come across each individual piece of evidence he or 
she asserts is not properly marshaled. It would pose little or no 
hardship for this Court to require the State to point out these 
instances. (To handle egregious cases, this Court could set a 
maximum limit of a half dozen "for instances", so the State doesn't 
have to summarize the entire record.) 
It hardly seems fair to require defense counsel to 
respond to unsupported accusations of failure to marshal, merely by 
the State's talismanic invocation of the phrase "failure to 
marshal." Guidance in this area would be helpful, and is 
respectfully requested. 
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Lake County Jail. This contention is without merit. If Mr. 
Peterson prevails on this appeal, then no probation violation 
occurred, no sentence is appropriate, and this issue is moot and 
need not be addressed. 
A. THE STATE HAS WAIVED ITS CLAIM BY FAILING 
TO RAISE THE MATTER BELOW. 
The State failed to raise the issue of the trial court's 
imposition of a one year sentence below. Under traditional notions 
of waiver, the issue should not be addressed here. "Generally, a 
[litigant] who fails to bring an issue before the trial court is 
barred from asserting it initially on appeal." State v. 
Archambeau, 820 P.2d 920, 922 (Utah App. 1991); accord State v. 
Johnson, 774 P.2d 1141, 1144 (Utah 1989) ("'some form of specific 
preservation of claims of error must be made a part of the trial 
court record before an appellate court will review such claim on 
appeal'", quoting State v. Tillman, 750 P.2d 546, 551 (Utah 1987)). 
The trial court has to date had no opportunity to rule on the 
merits of the claims the State now makes for the first time on 
appeal. Furthermore, the State did not cross appeal from Mr. 
Peterson's probation violation order. See Rule 4(d), Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure. 
Although appellate courts can address unpreserved issues 
under a "plain error" standard, see State v. Ellifritz, 835 P.2d 
170, 174 (Utah App. 1992), the State neither asserted plain error 
nor briefed its claim as such. The State correctly asserts that 
"the trial court has 'continuing jurisdiction' to correct an 
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illegal sentence." Brief of Appellee at 2 (emphasis added). The 
State fails to address why this matter has not been drawn to the 
attention of the trial court, so that it may address the question 
in the first instance: 
[I]n order to preserve a plea of error, the alleged error 
must have been raised seasonably by counsel to the trial 
court. The purpose of this rule is to allow the trial 
court to correct any error, if error there be. 
Utah County v. Brown, 672 P.2d 83, 85 (Utah 1983) (footnote 
omitted). 
In Utah, matters not raised in the pleadings nor put in 
issue at the trial may not be raised for the first time 
on appeal. Bundv v. Century Equip. Co., 692 P.2d 754, 
758 (Utah 1984); Franklin Fin, v. New Empire Dev. Co., 
659 P.2d 1040, 1044 (Utah 1983). A matter is 
sufficiently raised if it has been submitted to the trial 
court and the trial court has had an opportunity to make 
findings of fact or law. See Turtle Management, Inc. v. 
Haggis Management, Inc., 645 P.2d 667, 672 (Utah 1982) . 
James v. Preston, 746 P.2d 799, 801 (Utah App. 1987) . See also 
State v. Johnson, 218 Utah Adv. Rep. 3, 3 (Utah 1993) ("A defendant 
is obliged to seek a trial court's ruling on an issue before the 
issue can be raised in an appellate court.") ; Lamkin v. Lynch, 600 
P.2d 530, 533 (Utah 1979) ("This point is raised for the first time 
on appeal and hence was not ruled upon by the trial court."). 
The State's reliance on the fact that " [a] jurisdictional 
question may be entertained at any time during trial or on appeal," 
Appellee's Brief at 2, is misplaced. The State does not claim that 
the court was without jurisdiction to impose sentence for a 
probation violation; instead, the State merely argues that the 
sentence imposed was incorrect. 
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The sentence imposed by the trial court was not error, 
much less plain error. This issue should not be addressed here for 
the first time. 
B. THE SENTENCE IMPOSED BY THE COURT IS 
STATUTORILY AUTHORIZED. 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1(9) (e) allows the court to "order 
. . . that the entire probation term commence anew." Utah Code 
Ann. § 77-18-1(5) (e) provides that as a condition of probation, the 
defendant may be required to "serve a period of time in the county 
jail not to exceed one year." In this case, the trial court 
ordered that Mr. Peterson serve one year in the county jail. The 
sentence imposed was a de facto order of probation, conditioned on 
completion of one year in the county jail. 
The State mis-reads the court's order to be a revocation 
of probation, a refusal to reinstate probation, and imposition of 
an incorrect statutory sentence for a 2nd degree felony. The trial 
court's findings on the record indicate the contrary: 
THE COURT: Yeah. Well, first of all, the 
Court finds the defendant in violation of his probation 
and revokes probation. 
Secondly, I don't know whether he thinks that 
we all fell off a turnip truck yesterday or not, but he's 
not as smart as he thinks he is. 
He's played this game from before the case was 
tried. He has horsed this Court around, he has stalled 
and delayed and said, ["]oh, I'm such a good boy,["] on 
the one hand, and done everything possible on the other, 
to go about living his life as though he never committed 
this crime and as though the world were just his little 
cup of tulips. 
I am, frankly, tired of it. I'm tired of him, 
I'm tired of his attitude. His attitude is definitely 
bad news. 
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Mv reaction is to send him out to the Point of 
the Mountain, but barring that, I will follow the 
recommendations of Mr. Hansen. I will sentence him to 
one year in the Salt Lake County Jail, commencing today, 
forthwith, no time for credit served--no credit for time 
served. End of that, his restitution will be converted 
to a civil judgment and the matter will be at an end. 
R. 174:32-3 (emphasis added). The trial court expressly considered 
imposition of Mr. Peterson's suspended 1-15 year term, and rejected 
that option. Under § 77-18-1 (9) (e) , his other options were to 
order probation "modified, continued, or that the entire probation 
term commence anew." Whether viewed as a modification or a 
reinstatement is immaterial. The court did one or the other, and 
ordered a legal and proper probation condition of serving one year 
in the county jail. 
C. THE STATE HAS TAKEN INCONSISTENT 
POSITIONS IN THIS CASE. 
Mr. Peterson had expressed a desire to serve his one year 
term at the prison instead of the county jail, and with the State's 
consent, the court acquiesced. See R. 36, 38. On August 16, 1993, 
between the filing of Mr. Peterson's opening brief on July 27, 1993 
and the State's brief on October 4, 1993, the State moved in the 
trial court to correct Mr. Peterson's sentence and require Mr. 
Peterson to serve his term at the county jail. A hearing was held 
on August 27, 1993, and through counsel Mr. Peterson waived his 
presence3 and stipulated to transfer back to the Salt Lake county 
3Mr. Peterson was being housed at the prison facility in 
Gunnison and had not been transported to Salt Lake. 
8 
jail. A copy of the State's motion and notice of hearing is 
included in Addendum A. 
In its motion, the State indicated that it properly 
understood the court's sentence to be a reinstatement of probation 
conditioned on one year in the county jail, after which probation 
would terminate. See State's Motion at %2 ("That the Court 
sentenced the defendant to serve a term of 1 year in jail after 
which the probation of the defendant would be terminated."). The 
position the State now takes, that a prison term of 1-15 years 
should have been imposed, is inconsistent and should be rejected. 
CONCLUSION 
The order of the trial court finding a probation 
violation was error, and should be reversed. 
If not error, the 1 year incarceration in jail sentence 
the court imposed was proper, and should stand. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 3sJL day of November, 1993. 
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CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I, Robert K. Heineman, hereby certify that I have caused 
eight copies of the foregoing to be delivered to the Utah Court of 
Appeals, 400 Midtown Plaza, 230 South 500 East, Salt Lake City, 
Utah 84102, and four copies to Marian Decker, the Attorney 
General's Office, 236 State Capitol, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114, 
this 3/U. day of November, 1993. 
Robert K. H6ineman 
DELIVERED/MAILED this day of November, 1993 
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ADDENDUM A 
STATE'S MOTION TO CORRECT SENTENCE 
DAVID E. YOCOM 
Salt Lake County Attorney 
WALTER R. ELLETT, Bar No. 098 0 
Chief Deputy County Attorney 
231 East 400 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 363-7900 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, ) 
MOTION OF STATE TO CORRECT 
Plaintiff, ) SENTENCE 
-vs- ' 
Case No. 871916391FS 
DAVID PETERSON, ) 
, Hon. Richard H. Moffat 
Defendant. 
The State of Utah by Walter R. Ellett, Chief Deputy Salt 
Lake County Attorney, Justice Division, respectfully moves the 
Court to correct the sentence imposed in the above matter, 
pursuant to the provisions of Rule 22(e) Utah rules of Criminal 
Procedure. This motion is based upon the following: 
1. That on January 29, 1993 the above Court found 
defendant to be in violation of probation and entered its order 
revoking said probation. 
2. That the Court sentenced the defendant to serve a term 
of 1 year in jail after which the probation of the defendant 
would be terminated. 
MOTION OF STATE TO CORRECT SENTENCE 
Case No. 871916391FS 
Page 2 
3. That the Court permitted this defendant to express his 
election to serve the one year jail term at the Utah State Prison 
rather than the Salt Lake County Jail. 
4. That the only sentencing provision that allows the 
defendant to elect to serve a term of one year at the Utah State 
Prison is Section 76-3-208 (1) (b) Utah Code Annotated which 
provides specifically for Class A Misdemeanor commitments. 
5. That the election by the defendant to serve the one 
year sentence imposed by the Court at the Utah State Prison is 
improper and the defendant should be required to serve this term 
at the Salt Lake County Jail. 
WHEREFORE the State of Utah prays this Court to issue its 
order requiring defendant, David Peterson to be transported from 
the Utah State Prison to the Salt Lake County jail to serve the 
term imposed by the Court. 
DATED this 16th day of August, 1993. 
DAVID E. YOCOM 
Salt Lake County Attorney 
MOTION OF STATE TO CORRECT SENTENCE 
Case No. 871916391FS 
Page 3 
NOTICE OF HEARING 
TO: David Peterson and Legal Defender Association - Attorney for 
Defendant. 
You and each of you will please take notice that the State 
of Utah will call up for hearing the foregoing motion before the 
Honorable Richard H. Moffat, in his courtroom, 3rd Floor Circuit 
Court fs Building; Salt Lake City, Utah on Friday, the J2~7 day 
of {1/JuAAfsyV / 1993 at 10:30 a.m. or as soon thereafter as 
counsel/'tylay be heard. 
GOVERN YOURSELVES ACCORDINGLY. 
DATED this 16th day of August, 1993. 
DAVID E. YOCOM 
Salt Lake County Attorney 
Chief Deputv County Attorney 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing Motion Of State To Correct Sentence was delivered to 
the defendant David Peterson, Utah State Prison, PO Box 250, 
Draper, UT 84 020 and to the Legal Defenders Association, by 
placing a copy in its courier box at the office of the Salt Lake 
County Attorney on the /^ day of August, 1993. 
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